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ABSTRACT: Subjective experience presents a conundrum to science. Those convinced of its 
reality recognise that it requires explanation, but that classical physics is unable to provide one. 
They often assume that, as a consequence, quantum mechanics must provide the basis for a 
theory. However, consciousness seems able to reduce quantum wave packets, a process that 
quantum wave functions cannot accomplish, ruling out that approach. Recent research suggests 
that fluctuations at critical instabilities provide a non-reductive, double aspect information 
theory, i.e. properties identified as necessary aspects of any theory of experience. Due to 
complexity, biological systems support critical instabilities. Complexity means that they obey 
principles like Edge of Chaos and Fractal Physiology, and that organisms are not mechanical 
systems. Critical instabilities are in turn supported by the principle of Self-Organised Criticality, 
well known to be exhibited by neuronal cortices. The neurodynamics underlying experience and 
consciousness encompasses critical instabilities on networks of neurons. Due to a famous theorem 
from material science, the spin-glass neural network isomorphism, such instabilities can have 
arbitrary complexity, and can model and control genetic networks, well known to function at the 
Edge of Chaos. Here we show how information on sensory pathways enters conscious experience 
by means of the process of Inhibition of Lateral Inhibition identified by Karl Pribram, and 
making possible holographic representation of sense information.  
KEYWORDS: Experience; Criticality; Experience Information; Neural Networks; Sensory 
Pathways; Holographic Paradigm  
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INTRODUCTION 
Science has long treated the subject of phenomenal experience as an insoluble mystery, 
and been hostile to attempts to provide a scientific explanation for it. Part of the problem 
has been a misunderstanding of the word ‘objective’: science must remain objective. 
Some scientists interpret this to mean that science should therefore not be concerned 
with any question of how the world of subjectivity is supported in biology. But that 
constitutes a misunderstanding of the word ‘objective’, which really means that scientists 
should remain intellectually detached, and not be too attached to their preconceptions, 
when science progresses in ways that change them.  
Until quite recently, the conundrum presented to science by the phenomenon of 
experience was considered insoluble. Although many were convinced of the reality of 
experience and recognised that its explanation should be considered a potential scientific 
problem, they also recognized that neither classical physics not quantum physics were 
able to provide it. (Chalmers, 1997b) Classical physics describes entities in purely 
objective terms and is a non-starter. Quantum physics on the other hand seemed to 
involve consciousness at its foundations, and seemed more promising. This is because, in 
quantum physics, it was recognized that the phenomenon of ‘the collapse of the wave 
function’ requires an observer, with the ability to subjectively record and report an event. 
However, if an observer’s consciousness is to collapse a wave-function, or put more 
accurately, ‘reduce a packet of wave functions’ (shortened to ‘reduce the wave packet’) 
then something other than quantum wave functions must be involved, because quantum functions 
cannot accomplish this.  
In the 1990’s the situation completely changed when a student of philosophy, David 
Chalmers, published first his PhD thesis, a series of papers in the then new Journal of 
Consciousness Studies (Chalmers, 1995, 1996, 1997a), and then a book (Chalmers, 
1997b). Next the scientific community held a conference on his new approach, and all 
the comments and Chalmers’ responses were edited into a book by the JCS Editor, 
Jonathan Shear (Shear, 1997). Chalmers identified the phenomenon of experience itself 
as the main challenge confronting any aspiring theory of consciousness, and set out four 
conditions that any physical theory of experience would have to satisfy, two of which are 
discussed in the next paragraph. (Chalmers, 1997a, Reprinted in Shear, 1997) 
First, he posited that the experiencer, the subject, should be considered as 
fundamental a concept in the world of science as mass, or the electric charge. It should 
be accepted as beyond explanation, and as valid as other fundamental elements in 
physical science. Chalmers also pointed out that the theory should be non-reductive, and 
that it should be an information theory where the information possessed a double aspect 
enabling it not only to represent information, but also to specifically pertain to subjective 
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experience. In the last few years, just such an information theory has been discovered, 
moreover one which applies in biological regulation. 
COMPLEXITY BIOLOGY 
Complexity biology dates from Stuart Kauffman’s studies of genetic networks in the 
1960s (Kauffman, 1969), when he discovered that they operate under a regime that he 
named ‘The Edge of Chaos’. Genes are expressed not singly, but in ‘loops’ containing 
several genes, all of which are expressed at the same time. Such ‘loops of genes’ can 
induce or repress the expression of other loops of genes. What Kauffman discovered was 
that especially realistic conditions arise when each such loop acts on average on precisely 
two other loops of genes. If the number is less than two, then the system becomes static, 
with little or no change possible in which loops are being expressed, while when the 
number is more than two, the whole thing becomes unstable and chaotic, with genetic 
loops constantly being switched on and off. The number two, at the edge of the chaotic 
region, was the only coupling number, for which the realistic kinds of biological seemed 
to result. Ergo: loops of genes formed networks of genetic loops switching each other on 
and off, and such ‘genetic networks’ seemed to function at The Edge of Chaos. Thus 
was born the first principle of complexity biology (Kauffman, 1996).  
With Edge of Chaos come other properties. Physiological systems do not give fixed 
responses to a series of fixed stimuli, they rather respond with a distribution of responses; 
most unusual distributions at that. Rather than obeying statistical distributions of the 
usual kind, they are fractal distributions, giving rise to the general name, Fractal 
Physiology (Bassingthwaite, 1994). Such distributions are characteristic of systems at 
instabilities, meaning that some parameter of the system is no longer held firmly at a 
fixed value. Instead, like the density of a liquid at its critical point, some parameter of 
the system has become unstable, with its value fluctuating violently in a series of critical 
fluctuations. The advantages of this for regulation of the system turn out to be profound 
and to give physiological systems otherwise impossible sensitivity and flexibility of 
response. Variability of response also means that a population of organisms is more likely 
to survive a previously unencountered challenge in environmental circumstances. 
Whereas a population giving a fixed response would in all likelihood be annihilated by 
such a challenge, a population giving variable responses would be more likely to survive: 
if only one organism made a viable response, the entire population would be 
regenerated; furthermore, it would contain knowledge of how to respond appropriately 
the next time that challenge was encountered.  
The property of offering a fractal distribution of responses to a series of fixed stimuli 
results from the control structure in question being located at an instability; the locus of 
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control is an instability, a condition that is not difficult to arrange, since critical 
instabilities occur naturally in cybernetic control systems, as Norbert Wiener who 
formulated their theory in his book, Cybernetics, was first to point out (Wiener, 1948). 
The advantageous property of criticality is maintained in biological systems by a 
principle which maintains it: Self-Organised Criticality (SOC), which forms the fourth 
and final principle of complexity. (Bak et al., 1987)  
The physics of critical instabilities is dominated by critical point fluctuations. If the 
locus of control of the regulatory system of a particular organism function is at a critical 
instability, then its physics is governed by critical fluctuations. If another system needs to 
communicate to that system, it must utilize a language appropriate to the phenomenon 
of instability (Hankey, 2014). It is now known that the information theory available at 
instabilities is not that of digital information, applying at all points with stable physics. 
Physical excitations at instabilities possess a very different information structure; and, 
serendipitously the new structure has all the properties posited to be necessary for a 
theory of consciousness by David Chalmers.  
First, fluctuations at critical instabilities possess very high coherence lengths, keeping 
them so integrated that their physics cannot be reduced to individual excitations.  Such 
potential reduction may apply to ordinary quantum theory. but high levels of integration 
resulting from very long coherence lengths, mean that systems at criticality cannot be 
reduced to component excitations; they are non-reductive. (Hankey, 2014) 
Second, the information structure can be shown to have two components – the 
double-aspect structure predicted by Chalmers. Demonstration of this property is 
simple. Consider the example of fluid flowing down a tube. Under normal circumstances 
a fluid flows with constant speed and direction at each point: the flow at each point is 
defined by a single vector, <------------. However, at higher values of the pressure 
gradient, vortices form and the fluid no longer exhibits unique flow vectors at each point. 
At the critical point, characterised by a special value of ‘Reynolds’ number’ for the 
system, vortices are just unable to form, though they are present as it were, at an 
unmanifest level, at every point in the fluid. In this case the single vectors representing 
the flow become mixtures of single flow vectors; more precisely, an infinite number of 
single vectors, all stitched together by a vortex that is infinitesimal and unmanifest. This 
structure can be represented by <=========O. While the previous structure 
possesses only a single aspect – the vector itself, with length and direction – the new 
structure possess two aspects, the mixture of vectors <========, and the vortex loop, 
O. Clearly, this information possesses the ‘double aspect’ structure proposed by 
Chalmers. (Hankey, 2015) 
The novel structure of information may be hypothesized to apply to all systems at 
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critical instabilities, i.e. to biological instabilities as well as flow instabilities in fluids. This 
hypothesis transforms the structure into an ideal candidate to represent information in 
subjective experience: fluctuations at critical instabilities support a kind of information 
that is non-reductive, and which also possesses a double aspect, both the properties 
identified as necessary aspects of any information structure for it to support experience.  
EXPERIENCE 
How can nervous systems exhibit critical instabilities? For if they can do so, then the new 
form of information becomes a candidate to support subjective experience of the kind 
found in animals, including humans. The first step in showing that this may be possible 
comes from the theory of ferromagnets. Here systems of spins interact and align parallel 
only so long as the random effects of heat do not disrupt them too much. More 
complicated kinds of interaction make the spin system capable of more complicated kinds 
of magnetic phase transition, and correspondingly more complex kinds of critical 
phenomena, such as tricritical points and critical points of yet higher order. (Chang, 
1973; Hankey, 1973; Harbus, 1975). Eventually, the kinds of magnetic critical point 
culminate in forms that can model and control the entire structure of critical phenomena 
occurring in genetic networks, i.e. arbitrarily complex kinds of critical point. This 
requires a series of randomly arranged crystal lattice with arbitrarily long-ranged 
interactions, a system known as a spin-glass.  
Serendipitously, material science has stated a famous theorem, that a network of 
neurons has identical properties to a spin-glass (Amit et al, 1985), and that the two can 
be considered entirely equivalent: the spin-glass neural network isomorphism. This has 
the important consequence that the physics of information derived for critical 
instabilities, such as those in fluid flows, fluid densities, or in magnets, also applies to 
instabilities on networks of neurons. When life hit on cells with neuronal structures as 
suitable for organism control, doing so because networks of such cells could control cells’ 
genetic networks, networks of such cells exhibited information structures at their critical 
instabilities, which could support subjective experience.  
The conclusion for neuroscience is that experience is supported by neurodynamics 
of critical instabilities on networks of neurons, a highly unusual aspect of neuron function 
scarcely considered at all previously in the quest to understand consciousness.  
HOLOGRAPHIC PARADIGM 
Having identified candidate structures for the actualisation of experience in nervous 
systems, the question arises as to how sensory information can be encoded in such states. 
How can the manifestly digital information, which is transmitted along the neuronal 
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axons of the sensory pathways in the peripheral nervous system, be converted in 
experience information on the networks of neurons forming the cortices of the central 
nervous system? There can be no doubt that in the sense organs, and on the sensory 
pathways and the original encoding on the sensory cortices, sense information is 
represented in digital form. In the minds of many neuroscientists, this constitutes a major 
reason for them not to believe in subjective awareness as an aspect of brain function. 
(See Shear, 1999) However, they can only hold such beliefs (or non-beliefs) by neglecting 
a central aspect of the neuroscience of the registration of sensory information in 
consciousness, i.e. its coming to experience.  
Stanford neurosurgeon Karl Pribram who spent many years studying pathways of 
information in the brain, concluded that sensory information is not registered in 
consciousness immediately it arrives at the cortical area for that sense, i.e. the visual 
cortex for vision, auditory cortex for hearing, and so on. Pribram showed that sense 
information is only registered in experience following a special process in the cortex 
concerned, known as the Inhibition of Lateral Inhibition (ILI). First the information is 
registered in the cortex, where it is held and confirmed by the process of lateral 
inhibition, which keeps it well defined. Then it is allowed to spread over the entire cortex 
by ILI. Pribram showed that only when ILI has occurred does the information register 
in experience. (Pribram, 1981) 
And what does the ILI process accomplish – the lateralization of the information 
might be expected merely to wipe the slate clean for the next piece of information to 
appear. For our purpose, the observation that ILI is required to register information in 
experience is vital, first because it means that the form of information in the sensory 
cortex, digital information, is not the form of information in experience, and second 
because just such a linear transformation would be required to convert the digital 
information in a sensory cortex into the kind of information, by which a critical 
instability on the cortex could represent it in experience.  
Karl Pribram was partly directed to the investigations leading to his conclusion by 
observations that information in experience could not be found in any particular place in the cortex. 
This suggested that such information was contained all over the cortex, a form only made 
possible by a process of linear transformation, similar to that by which a Fourier 
Transform converts a digital picture into a hologram. Karl Pribram’s concept was 
therefore called, ‘The Holographic Paradigm’, and written up in a series of essays 
published by Ken Wilbur as a book of that name (Wilbur, 1982).  
CONCLUSIONS 
Nervous systems are admirably equipped to support experience. The phenomenon is 
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made possible by their ability to support critical instabilities, since the structure of 
information at critical instabilities satisfies all the conditions laid down by David 
Chalmers: the information structure is non-reductive (due to its long range critical 
correlations), and is a double aspect structure due its form as <=========O, 
containing both an internal information loop, O, and a mixture of information vectors, 
<=========.  
Information from sensory pathways, stored as digital information in digital cortices, 
is converted into experience information by a general linear transformation known as 
inhibition of lateral inhibition (ILI) in its sensory cortex, known to be the final 
information processing step on the pathways bringing information from the five senses 
to conscious awareness.  
At the same time, the actual subject cannot be defined, and must be considered a 
fundamental concept in its own right. In the same way that electric charge is what 
couples matter to electromagnetic fields in Maxwell’s equations, and mass is what 
couples matter to gravitational field in Einstein’s field equations, the subject is the entity 
that couples to the universe in experience information. 
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